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Chief Justice Michael Dishington Scott signed a court order in 
the Supreme Court of Tonga on December the 4th 2012, 
signifying structural reform in the South Pacific Kingdom.  
Whether the Kingdom of Tonga was ready or not, clued-up on 
what a judicial review was or not, the legal process for 
initiating one to get a judge to review parliamentary procedure 
was underway. 
Dishington Scott’s Supreme Court order issued by the 
Nuku’alofa Registry “ordered that the application for leave to 
apply for Judicial Review is to be heard inter parties on 23 
January, 2013 at 09:00 am in Court” (Supreme Court of 
Tonga, 2012).  The application was made by Tonga’s former 
Prime Minister, Feleti Sevele, and a former Minister for 
Transport in his cabinet, Paul Karalus.  The other party, 
meaning the people defending themselves against the 
application, were six men.  They were named on the court 
order as “Samuela ‘Akilisi Pohiva, Lord Lasike now known as 
Hikule’o Havea, Lord Tu’i’afitu, Dr Sitiveni Halapua, Pohiva 
Tu’i’onetoa, and Posesi Bloomfield” (Supreme Court of Tonga, 
2012).  These men were contributors to the Report of the 
Parliamentary Select Committee: The Nuku’alofa Development 
Council/Corporation and the Reconstruction of Nuku’alofa 
Central Business District, dated 5 June 2012 (Parliamentary 
Select Committee, 2012).  And it was this very report of 181 
pages, which had brought about Sevele and Karalus’ joint 
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application to the Supreme Court for a judicial review.  Put 
simply, Sevele and Karalus wanted the report quashed. 
What compelled the Prime Minister of Tonga Lord 
Tu’ivakano to call for a parliamentary select committee headed 
by the opposition leader and deputy to write this report?  What 
did it allege to prompt court action from Sevele and Karalus?  
If there was a judicial review of the parliamentary system 
governing how and why the report was carried out, then what 
constitutional principles might come under the court’s 
examination?  At the 2010 general election, this small island 
developing state was applauded by New Zealand, Australia, 
and the United States of America for moving to a more 
democratic system of parliament and government.  In 2013, 
what did the report that went to court indicate about political 




The great hearted and the mean 
 
It is only the great hearted who can be true friends.  
The mean and cowardly, can never know what true 
friendship means. 
Charles Kingsley  
 
In September of 2012 after Tonga’s parliamentary select 
committee had released their report on Nuku’alofa’s 
reconstruction, Radio New Zealand called my home landline.  
The reason why the journalist dialled a comment is because I 
published a book in 2011 called Shoot the Messenger: The 
report on the Nuku’alofa reconstruction project and why the 
Government of Tonga dumped it (Brown Pulu, 2011). 
This particular journalist tried his hand at regional news 
by giving a political commentary on Shoot the Messenger.  He 
never got the guts of the Tongan debacle because as he 
admitted over email, he stopped reading my book after the first 
section.  He should have read the second section; this was the 
actual report I authored on the same subject as the select 
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committee’s study, framed by the same terms of reference that 
I decided on and penned, not the government. 
I was being tracked by a white Australian male reporter 
mangling Tongan words in a fair dinkum Aussie drawl and 
oblivious to social change.  In the second decade of the 21st 
century, I felt bothered listening to a white man getting paid to 
report Pacific news on public radio display no effort to 
pronounce Tongan words correctly.  Coming across fie’ poto, 
meaning a know-it-all, he appeared hungry for a controversial 
story that could launch him into media notoriety with 
established journalists such as Bruce Hill and Geraldine 
Coutts of Radio Australia.  Plainly the reporter wanted a scoop 
without having to get his head around an anthropologist’s 
book on development complexity (The Economist, 2013; 
Morozov, 2011, 2013). 
 
 
Melino Maka (right) with the late Baron Fielakepa, the 
noble of Havelu’loto, in August 2008 at the coronation of 
the late monarch, King George Tupou V of Tonga. 
 
My rendition had gotten me and my colleague Melino Maka 
fired from the prime minister of Tonga’s office.  I felt sympathy 
for Melino.  I wrote the report and he got the sack with me, a 
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Tongan sentence of guilty by association for assisting the 
author with field research and photographs.  On the 15th of 
June 2011, the night we got our marching orders out of the 
Kingdom of Tonga, Lord Ma’afu, the Minister for Lands and 
Environment, cautioned me to look out for Melino.  He was 
fond of him.  Ma’afu wore his heart in his eyes which were 
tear-filled.  I had permanent tenure at AUT University; my 
career was beginning to move up a notch, and my doctoral 
education would see me right on the regional job market.  But 
Melino was in his late-50s, a Tongan migrant working as a 
self-employed consultant in Auckland. 
There was risk that a group of Auckland Tongans, who 
had it in for Melino because they assumed he was anti the 
Democratic Party of the Friendly Islands, would scorn and 
mock that he got booted.  If they turned rabid with malevolent 
gossip, exposing the meanness of a small blinkered society, 
they could have made it difficult for him to get contract work 
and hold his head up in the New Zealand Tongan community.  
From that time onwards, I committed Ma’afu’s heart to mine.  
He taught me true friendship is valuable, especially when one 
is the underdog getting unfairly attacked by an angry mob.  
Hence, I have remained colleagues with Melino Maka from the 
village of Tatakamotonga ever since. 
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Lord Ma’afu, head of the Ha’a Havea Lahi and the noble 
of Vaini and Tokomololo who holds the Government of 
Tonga portfolio as the Minister for Lands and 
Environment. 
 
Understandably Melino supported my publishing a critique 
of how the Government of Tonga handled the parliamentary 
select committee report.  Closely following the tangled events 
that unravelled, he sourced documents and information 
relevant to my writing.  In 2011 when we were under scrutiny 
from the prime minister’s office, he did what was right by his 
conscience and stood with me on the report I wrote.  Back 
then, I was not going to allow the hierarchy to gag me, nor give 
in to fear of retribution.  He felt the same.  Determinedly I had 
made up my mind that if I got beaten down by political power, 
I would dig my feet in, stand my ground, and speak the truth 
even if my voice trembled. 
In solidarity we wanted to see social justice prevail over the 
unsubstantiated accusations made against people involved in 
the Nuku’alofa reconstruction after the capital was destroyed 
by the 2006 riot.  In reality we knew our sacking order was for 
not digging up dirt on the former Prime Minister Feleti Sevele, 
his government, and his economic advisor Rob Solomon, who 
Report Went to Court 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 6, 2013, ISSN 1178-6035 
189 
took out the EXIM Bank of China loan to finance the capital’s 
rebuilding.  But there was no mud at the bottom of this 
imaginary quagmire.  Why shoot the messenger when a clean 
bill of health was a step forward for Tonga? 
The truth was Tonga’s 21st century history of successive 
governments had caused a social epidemic.  This developing 
country had grown accustomed to moving one step forward to 
political reform and sliding two steps back into financial 
arrears.  There was a simple reason why the consecutive 
reports stirred controversy.  The subject under examination 
tapped the national debt nerve. 
 
 
Vuna wharf in Nuku’alofa, the Kingdom of Tonga, 
reconstructed by the EXIM Bank of China loan. 
 
Despite the fact that my 2011 findings were divergent to 
the parliamentary select committee’s 2012 recommendations, 
the reports intersected on debt anxiety and public worry as to 
how the government would repay the EXIM Bank of China 
loan considering that Tonga’s economy was broke.  The glaring 
difference was the committee played on public fear by blaming 
the last government under Feleti Sevele’s leadership for the 
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debt.  They pursued this line of argument without noting the 
loan was taken out to rebuild a capital destroyed by civil riot.  
Which brings into question the committee’s political agenda; 




In 2011 the Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano had two advisors, 
‘Akau’ola who was also known as Mapa Faletau, and 
‘Ahongalu Fusimalohi.  During the Feleti Sevele government 
from 2006 to 2010, they were employed by the state.  Both left 
their posts, and it was speculated they were nudged.  Many 
concluded the advisors and others, such as the current 
auditor general, the director of planning and urban 
management, and the former general manager of the 
Nuku’alofa Ports Authority, held personal grievances against 
Tonga’s former prime minister, feeling slighted during his 
term.  The advisors gave birth to a brainchild, figuring that 
heavy-handedly dismissing me and Melino Maka would be the 
death of the report and all it revealed. 
What was uncovered is that they were party to 
undermining politics against the previous prime minister and 
his government of which the current Prime Minister Lord 
Tu’ivakano was a senior cabinet minister, and Lord Ma’afu, 
Lisiate ‘Akolo, and Clive Edwards of the present cabinet were 
also ministers.  It was not that I had dobbed him in which 
muddied the prime minister’s public image as a trustworthy 
leader.  But rather, never once during the three months of 
April to June 2011 in which I researched the report did the 
prime minister rein in his advisors for crossing the 
bureaucracy’s ethical code of conduct.  By doing nothing, he 
looked as if he condoned their behaviour. 
True to the nature of a political plot, the story had a twist.  
The seeds of a subversive attack had been planted by third 
parties.  The opposition leaders and certain government 
employees, expressly the director of planning and urban 
management, were telling tales to the prime minister of the 
day about the prime minister of the past, which turned his ear 
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towards them and away from the former premier and 
government he served in.  For some reason of their own 
making, the prime minister’s advisors bought into ‘Akilisi 
Pohiva and Sitiveni Halapua’s contention that the previous 
government had diddled the books, skimmed the loan, and 
short-changed the country.  They pushed this line with the 
Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano who fell hook, line, and sinker 
into its treacherous course. 
Worse still, they acted purely on hearsay without proof of 
wrongdoing or maintaining that natural justice, the principle 
against bias and the right to a fair hearing was given to the 
accused.  Prejudice shaped the deduction that the former 
prime minister and his associates were guilty of fraudulent 
acts; the kind of narrow-mindedness crafted into existence by 
Tongan rumour and scandal, unchecked and rampant like an 
uncontrollable outbreak in a small island developing state.   
The classic downfall of unbridled patriarchy and class 
structure was highlighted by the advisors’ attitude.  As men 
close to the centre of power, they assumed they could get 
around being held to account by a woman or a man on the 
periphery, the ordinary people well below their station in the 
hierarchy.  It was the kind of manmade error that propelled a 
predominant belief that Western democracy is the superior 
system of power to advance social equality and fair-treatment 
for all people under the rule of law. 
When the report and the sacking order got blown open in 
public by Kalafi Moala, Tonga’s long-standing advocate for 
democracy and media freedom, the prime minister’s advisors 
were deeply resistant to recognising the ill-effects of their 
behaviour, and upon self-reflection change.  If anything, denial 
obliged them to pull hard the other way.  ‘Ahongalu 
Fusimalohi defended the actions of the prime minister’s office 
to Radio Australia’s Bruce Hill, driven by his conviction that 
the report was inadequate and the duo responsible for 
producing it, me and Melino, unprofessional and doubly 
deficient (Hill, 2011). 
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Shoot the Messenger on sale at the Friendly Islands 
Bookshop for TOP$35 pa’anga in Nuku’alofa, Kingdom of 
Tonga. 
 
I put the full report in a book published by Kalafi Moala’s 
press, Taimi Publishers, for Tongans to have access to the 
information it contained, and by doing so, I became woven in 
the tempestuous political tapestry of Tonga’s post-2010 
reform.  Radio New Zealand and Radio Australia interviewed 
me, publicly airing the book’s content in snippets and sound-
bites.  I was told by a Tongan reporter he had asked ‘Akau’ola 
at Fua’amotu International Airport what he thought of my 
book.  ‘Akau’ola angrily erupted: “Teena is crazy!” 
And here lies my claim to understated media fame as the 
queen of coconuts, bananas, and tropical fruit controversy; a 
self-inflicted title I wear for being an outspoken woman who is 
too honest, too critical, and too spirited among men 
acquainted with women knowing their lowly place in the 
important matters of political life.  From this experience, I 
learned that Tongan politics staked out a man’s world, an 
exclusive setting in which women were occasionally permitted 
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to make guest appearances in support of the men who ruled 
over them. 
Speaking up about the manipulation of power in a small 
island developing state, got me punished for challenging men 
of authority on the wrongful estimation of others.  Reactionary 
and inward-looking Tongans were staggered that the Prime 
Minister Lord Tu’ivakano was my matrilineal uncle, my 
mother’s second cousin, identifying me under the conservative 
Tongan microscope as a hybrid species that went against the 
tradition of going along with very important relatives even if 
you disagreed with their opinions. 
Publishing the report was my way of fronting up as a 
woman of difference to the male-dominated storm encircling 
its inception and rejection (Bradford, 2013).  Fickle political 
weather ignited slurs and slights, exacerbating the conditions 
crippling Tonga’s newborn democracy and ailing economy 
(Fonua 2012).  I should have known that egos, personalities, 
and politics in a small poor country might not settle down, but 




In 2012, the Legislative Assembly of Tonga hinged on two 
crucial debates which were complexly tangled, shaping public 
perception on democracy’s pitfalls in the second year of a new 
political arrangement, a system that was designed to bring 
about greater representative government (Radio New Zealand, 
2012b).  The first entered the House on June the 28th 2012 
when ‘Akilisi Pohiva, leader of the democratic party with the 
support of nine people’s representatives, motioned for a vote of 
no confidence in the Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano.  More 
than three months later on October the 8th 2012, Pohiva lost 
the vote by 13 to 11, and consequently threatened criminal 
court action against the government for “allegedly 
misappropriating public funds” (Coutts, 2012; Matangi Tonga, 
2012; Ministry of Information and Communications, 2012; 
Radio New Zealand, 2012a; Television New Zealand, 2012). 
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The second cropped up in late August when ‘Akilisi Pohiva, 
the chair of the parliamentary select committee established by 
Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano to produce a report on the 
reconstruction of Nuku’alofa, tabled the final document.  
Submitted to the House was a 181-page report from the six 
member committee.  Following the civil riot and destruction of 
eighty per cent of the central business district on November 
16th 2006, the former government led by Feleti Sevele took out 
an EXIM Bank of China loan for TOP$118 million pa’anga, 
specifically for rebuilding Tonga’s capital (Brown Pulu, 2011).  
Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano stated in parliament that he 
wanted the report “not to investigate, but to gather and fit 
together all the information in connection with the 
reconstruction of Nuku’alofa” (Parliamentary Select 
Committee, 2012, p. 7). 
The motion of no confidence and the report on 
Nuku’alofa’s reconstruction rushed into parliament one by 
one, knocking into each other, and stirring more questions 
than answers about democracy and how it should actually be 
practiced (Radio New Zealand, 2012b).  In many ways, 
doubling up two contentious issues as a political strategy to 
derail government did the reverse.  By this, Pohiva and his 
party were by no means naturally attributed as having a 
monopoly over democracy because they were elected people’s 
representatives, commoners not nobles, and had used the 
name democratic as their party brand.  If anything, ‘Akilisi 
Pohiva and Sitiveni Halapua, the opposition leaders, were 
challenged by the public as to whether their words, thoughts, 
and deeds were at all democratic, fair-minded, impartial, even-
handed, consultative, and aligned with the popular 
catchphrase, transparent and accountable to the people. 
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‘Akilisi Pohiva, leader of the Democratic Party of the 
Friendly Islands and people’s representative to the 
Parliament of Tonga for constituency Tongatapu 1, 
pictured at the 2010 closing of parliament, Nuku’alofa, 
Kingdom of Tonga. 
 
The report’s opening painted a backdrop of how it came to 
be commissioned by the prime minister in his statement to the 
House explaining who would be part of the select committee, 
as well as their collective purpose.  Inadvertently, it exposed 
political wills at battle for power.  Almost a year before the 
report had been completed Pohiva and Halapua wanted the 
Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano to take action based on the 
parliamentary report’s findings.   
In this case, it was not singly that it appeared early on in 
the piece to pressure the prime minister into accepting 
whatever the select committee came up with, the government 
would see to it.  But rather, by insisting that the prime 
minister should agree to their request revealed that there 
existed in Pohiva and Halapua’s minds, predetermined 
assumptions as to what kind of information they might find 
out about the former Sevele government’s handling of the 
Nuku’alofa reconstruction. 
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Before accepting the work, ‘Akilisi Pohiva and Dr. 
Sitiveni Halapua sought an undertaking from the Prime 
Minister that the findings and recommendations of the 
Committee would be properly actioned by the 
Government.  It was important to the People’s 
representatives that the Government would be serious 
about considering the implementation of the report’s 
recommendations. (Parliamentary Select Committee, 
2012, pp. 8-9). 
 
The report was politically motivated, and served as a blunt 
instrument that could be manoeuvred by its creators for 
leverage, for bargaining to bring down the government.  Of the 
four key recommendations, the third suggestion uncovered the 
underpinning agenda to criminally investigate and prosecute 
individuals from the former government and associates singled 
out as people “who benefitted from this “local spending”” 
(Parliamentary Select Committee, 2012, p. 170).  Convinced 
that millions had been misused for, or misappropriated from, 
certain projects in the overall reconstruction of Nuku’alofa, 
and despite the claim of Tonga’s Attorney General Neil Adsett 
“that nothing in the report points to any misuse of funds,” 
Pohiva and Halapua were determined to pursue a “criminal 
investigation” (Komisoni Fakamafola Le’a Tonga, 2012; 
Parliamentary Select Committee, 2012, p. 170). 
 
The report has found that deliberate adjustments were 
made to the initial contract cost of projects in order to 
accommodate T$23,448,629 being recorded as “local 
spending by CCECC in relation to the Royal Palace 
Extension project.  This raises questions concerning 
who benefitted from this “local spending” as well as the 
level of actual transfers of foreign currency 
(USD$22,753,596.67) relating to the Royal Palace 
Extension Project, the City Assets (Molisi Tonga), the 
Vuna Wharf construction.  It is a finding of this report 
that this warrants a criminal investigation and 
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prosecution by an independent prosecutor. 
(Parliamentary Select Committee Report, 2012, p. 170).  
 
Here, I am contextually reading the parliamentary select 
committee report (2012) by questioning what the authors 
desired by their third recommendation in light of Tonga’s weak 
democracy and struggling to stay afloat Pacific Island 
economy.  The report coupled with the motion for no 
confidence in the Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano had 
destabilised political reform in the second year of starting out; 
not because there was no system for managing a select 
committee report submitted to the legislature, but rather, the 
political pressure put on the prime minister by the opposition 
leaders outweighed good procedural sense.  In the public’s eye 
from the way the report was handled in the House, democracy 
– a system of government and parliament where the people 
have an equal say in development issues and laws affecting 
their lives either directly or through an elected representative – 
was not evidently seen at work in the Tongan legislative 
assembly.   
Perceptibly in 2012, parliament shifted away from strictly 
law making and debating the effectiveness of state 
development priorities, becoming locked in disagreement over 
how to proceed with Pohiva and Halapua’s report.  Uncertainty 
about parliamentary process and the rule of law also seeped 
into how a vote of no confidence in the prime minister was 
dealt with.  For over three months, closer to four, the no 
confidence motion was suspended in indecision while the 
public, private sector businesses, international aid donors, 
and the government bureaucracy were left to surmise about 
what could, or could not, happen to a fragile democracy and 
economy if a change of government came to pass before the 
Tu’ivakano administration finished the four year term. 
Scanning the political environment that allowed the 
parliamentary select committee work to consume government 
and parliament business I have taken an alternative view to 
the lens under which New Zealand media has examined the 
report furore on the Nuku’alofa reconstruction.  Instead of 
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generalising that this was the second report on the same 
subject which the government opposed – the first report 
authored by myself in 2011 with Melino Maka’s fieldwork 
assistance being rejected by the prime minister and his former 
advisors – I have a different query.  Precisely what did the 
democratic party leaders, ‘Akilisi Pohiva and Sitiveni Halapua, 
set-out to do to the political system at work between the 
Tongan state and its citizens? 
Notably the report exhibited an obvious flaw in not being 
meticulous about affording due process to certain individuals 
implicated in the report; that is, the obligation of the state to 
recognise the rights of citizens by which people accused of 
wrongdoing are given a reasonable opportunity to respond to 
allegations.  How did the Parliament of Tonga get like this?  
Emerging from 2011 and 2012, what circumstances created 
favourable conditions to cultivate “fertile tensions,” a rich field 
in which parliamentary politics could weaken an inexperienced 
democratic state? (Spivak, 1990, p. 99). 
Two years of perilous politicking caused real consequences 
for Tonga’s economy and social wellbeing.  Tongan people were 
poorer, and not just monetarily, but in moral fibre, strength of 
mind, and optimism (Matangi Tonga, 2013).  Aloma 
Johannson, President of the Tonga Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, gave parliament and government the hard word from 
the business sector.  In an interview with Karen Magnall, 
Radio New Zealand’s Pacific correspondent, Johansson showed 
her frustration with what she considered was a democratic 
state inactive about mobilising a broke economy.   
Brusquely she stated, “Has anything changed?  Actually, 
personally I don’t think so.”  Johansson’s revealing insight was 
that the “people who’re purporting democracy,” namely ‘Akilisi 
Pohiva and the Sitiveni Halapua of the democratic party,” have 
“nothing constructive” to bring to parliament apart from “all 
the other trivial social problems” (Magnall, 2012).  
 
Public opinion in terms of the democratic process is that 
government is better in terms of the fact that they are 
more willing to listen to the public, and that they’re 
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seeking consultation with the public.  Has anything 
changed?  Actually, personally I don’t think so.  In fact 
in some ways I think it’s worse.  There’s nothing 
constructive that all of these people who’re purporting 
democracy, we’ve never had nothing.  What happened 
to parliament?  All we hear about [are] all the other 
trivial social problems without hearing anything 
constructive about how we’re going to build this 
economy up.  The parliamentarians spend more time 
talking about rugby. (Magnall, 2012). 
 
Politics in the House had grown a fertile bed of tension 
from which Feleti Sevele and Paul Karalus’ application to the 
Supreme Court for a judicial review materialised.  In this day-
and-age, to petition the court to examine whether the 
parliamentary select committee report (2012) had violated 
constitutional procedure was likened to the old Parliament of 
Tonga almost twenty years ago (Adams, 2013).  As Aloma 
Johansson intimated, this was not the way that the Tongan 
public expected a reformed parliament to be headed, which 
appeared to be backwards. 
In 1996, Justice Nigel Hampton’s verdict on Moala versus 
the Kingdom of Tonga presented the Supreme Court 
judgement on the Parliament of Tonga’s trial and sentencing of 
‘Eakalafi Moala, Filokalafi ‘Akau’ola, and ‘Akilisi Pohiva to 
thirty days jail (Moala 2002; Supreme Court of Tonga, 1996).  
Judge Hampton overturned a state punishment handed to 
these men for gathering information on, and publishing about, 
the impeachment of a cabinet minister, Tevita Tupou.  Ruling 
that the legislature had contravened civil freedoms 
constitutionally guaranteed all citizens, Hampton stressed the 
accused were not served a written notice stating the alleged 
crime, nor were they permitted to defend themselves by legal 
counsel.   
Seventeen years had passed since Moala’s case.  What did 
this say about democracy’s security in the Kingdom of Tonga?  
Colin Pigeon QC (Queens Counsel) of Auckland, New Zealand, 
acted as legal representation for Feleti Sevele and Paul 
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Karalus’ joint claim that the parliamentary select committee 
(2012) had abandoned natural justice in the process of 
carrying out and submitting their report to the legislature.  In 
the first instance, the grounds for court action were the 
committee forfeited the applicants’ right to defend themselves 
against criminal accusation.  Specifically, the accused had not 
been notified in writing of the crime they were alleged to have 
committed.  From the outset, factors informing Justice 
Hampton’s 1996 ruling on Tonga’s precedent case of Moala 
versus the Kingdom of Tonga looked as if they were tailor 
made for applying to the Sevele and Karalus’ Supreme Court 
case in 2013.   
But how did the 2013 Legislative Assembly of Tonga 
backtrack nearly two decades to jaywalk headfirst into an 
unsafe political situation that the court had outlawed in 1996 
as unconstitutional?  Opposition leader, ‘Akilisi Pohiva, 
revealed his party’s relationship with the Tu’ivakano 
government made him “feel more comfortable” and “positive” in 
contrast to the Sevele government of the past (Magnall, 2012).  
The adage aptly describing this “comfortable” arrangement 
was familiarity breeds contempt.  The leader of the opposition 
and the leader of government knew each other personally in 
the sense that they were familiar with one another’s faults and 
weaknesses.  As the saying goes, when one becomes extremely 
accustomed and experienced with the shortcomings of a 
person’s thinking and behaviour, especially in political 
leadership, you can lose respect for them. 
 
We are feel more comfortable, more independent in the 
way we express ourselves.  Not only that, but the 
response from the government is a little bit positive 
now; that was not the case before. (Magnall, 2012). 
 
 
Governance is culture 
One factor that shone like a light about Tonga’s democracy 
troubles was such an obvious reflection it often became oddly 
overlooked: The Kingdom of Tonga was not a developed 
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country.  Overseas Tongans in New Zealand, Australia, and 
America outnumbered the homeland population, feeding 
remittances to the islands as well as developed country 
expectations that a Western style democracy, modelled on 
their Pacific Rim countries of residence, would increase 
Tonga’s wealth and the people’s liberty. 
Tonga’s economic condition as a developing country did 
not alter, highlighting that the idealism of well-intentioned 
relatives living abroad was fractured from day-to-day reality.  
In this sense, because Tonga was not an industrialised country 
with an aggressive capitalist economy captured by the 
business sector, Western thought on governance and 
governmentality did not entirely rule over the Tongan state 
and society, despite how many parliamentarians and state 
bureaucrats acquired training from and qualifications at New 
Zealand, Australian, and American tertiary or military 
providers (Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991; Lemke 2000, 
2001). 
By governance and governmentality I am alluding to 
Michel Foucault’s work (Foucault, 1977).  As Thomas Lemke 
observed, it is Foucault’s framing of “the problem of 
government” by “the technologies of power” and “the political 
rationality underpinning them” that I am interested in here 
(Lemke, 2000, p. 2).  Put succinctly, Foucault distinguished 
governmentality as the “differentiation between power and 
domination,” in the sense that the modern state is based on 
an interwoven system of “governing the self and governing 
others” (Lemke, 2000, p. 3). 
For my essay’s purpose, I am probing the modern Tongan 
state, namely parliament and government, in relation to 
governmentality.  Tongan governmentality is taken to mean 
the reasoning and practices by which the “political structure 
and hierarchy” governs the state system in respect of its 
citizens, the people (Ministry of Information and 
Communications, 2013).  If the hierarchy represents the 
political authority of the state, then how is power exercised to 
dominate human beings by turning them into subjects? 
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The Kingdom of Tonga retained a non-Western edge to 
doing parliamentary democracy.  Political organisation 
represented the marriage of two 19th century social 
institutions, traditional hierarchy and Christian church.  The 
Tongan state therefore conceived of a rationale validating its 
uniqueness compared to other Pacific Island countries.  
Modernity was crafted from the British mould of a 
constitutional monarchy affiliated to the Wesleyan church.  
The difference was that national identity represented a 
political system driven by cultural resilience, grown from being 
the last remaining South Seas Kingdom and the only Pacific 
Island state not to be formerly colonised by the British Empire. 
Tongan state ideology in the South Pacific region 
accentuated that it stood apart from Fiji and Samoa’s national 
histories, Pacific states which had been administered as 
colonies of Britain and New Zealand.  Tonga was “free and 
proud of it” announced the late noble Ma’afu in 1975, the 
father of the current Lord Ma’afu of Vaini and Tokomololo 
(Morton, 2001, p. 47; Ma’afu. 1975; Marcus 1978).  This line 
of reasoning from thirty eight years ago was significant for 
making sense of the 21st century political landscape. 
Putting emphasis on “free and proud of it,” the noble 
Ma’afu meant that Tonga’s 1875 constitution engineered by 
King George Tupou I brought political emancipation and social 
change to the island Kingdom.  In this context, constitutional 
civil freedoms guaranteed to citizens who were Tongan by 
blood and eligible to receive land under traditional tenure, was 
a 19th century construct practiced by today’s law and society.  
To Ma’afu, freedom under the state was not the bone of 
contention in Tonga. 
Ma’afu’s reflections were evoked and echoed in April of 
2013 when country “leaders from across the Commonwealth’s 
small states attended a high-level conference on governance at 
Malborough House, London” (The Commonwealth, 2013).  
Commonwealth Secretary General, Kamalesh Sharma, mapped 
out what this inaugural meeting intended to achieve by 
“finding answers to the specific challenges these nations are 
facing in developing a public administration to meet the 
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expectations of their citizens, and the joint responsibility of the 
political and administrative leadership towards that end” (The 
Commonwealth, 2013).  Tonga had an answer to teething 
troubles with democratising governance, a remedy firmly 
rooted in the noble Ma’afu’s 20th century rationality tied to a 
19th century past. 
 
 
The late King George Tupou V at his 2008 coronation 
ceremony in Nuku’alofa, Kingdom of Tonga. 
 
Princess Siu’ilikutapu, a first cousin to King Tupou VI, 
addressed the Commonwealth gathering with a speech that 
exhibited a telling title: Adapting traditional governance to 
contemporary political and policy challenges.  Her opening lines 
reinforced the logic that modern Tongan governance had not 
shifted from its 19th century inception.  
 
May I begin by noting that the time frame for most of 
Tonga’s historical governance modernisation, wherein 
the traditional ideology, structure and operation of 
government to be modernised was actually in the 
nineteenth century and not in more contemporary times. 
(Ministry of Information and Communications, 2013).   
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Siu’ilikutapu elaborated on Tongan thought shaping how 
“the political nation of Tonga” was conceptualised and put into 
practice.  Essentially, the “kinship system” integrated into “the 
traditional political structure” produced a Tongan model of the 
nation-state in which “hierarchy” and patriarchy formed the 
scaffolding that defined and confined “the roles of the 
Government of Tonga” (Ministry of Information and 
Communications, 2013).  Modern governance in the 21st 
century still functioned by the governmentality that “the 
political nation of Tonga” exemplified the nationalisation of a 
culture of kinship.  In a nutshell, governance is culture.  
Culture is kinship.  Kinship is political.  And the political is 
male hierarchy (Marcus, 1978). 
 
When we turn to the traditional political structure, 
hierarchy, and the roles of the Government of Tonga, 
we find that they are none other than the same kinship 
structure and system.  That is, the ‘ulumotua, chiefs, 
nobles and the Hau forming the Government of Tonga, 
and their basic roles and authority, as well as their 
ideology of governance, were those of the kinship 
system.  It is this unique combination of the kinship-
political formula, structure and ideology, which has 
given Tonga her unique historical cohesion, stability 
and strengths.  This is the political nation of Tonga. 
(Ministry of Information and Communications, 2013). 
 
Siu’ilikupatu’s words and sentiments staked out 
governance territory in Tonga’s political system, positioning 
her own kind, the traditional ruling class, at the forefront of 
leading government and the nation-state.  The snag was inside 
the structure and organisation of the Tongan state where an 
inherent dilemma persisted across generations.  A troubling 
predicament had become muted in parliamentary debate while 
surfacing in the everyday talk of Tongans living in the island 
homeland and the diasporic settlements of Pacific Rim states.  
Put simply, Tonga’s struggle to consolidate political reform 
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pivoted on how far the country would drive towards replicating 
a Western liberal democracy in contrast to how much of the 
traditional leadership system governance and governmentality 
would retain (Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991; Lemke 2000, 
2001). 
Tonga’s post-2010 democratisation had, perhaps 
inadvertently, firmed up conventional battle lines, instead of 
negotiating class differences by a conciliatory method in which 
“all men are equal” under the state seemed real and believable 
(Ministry of Information and Communications, 2013).  
Siu’ilikutapu and her kind, and ‘Akilisi Pohiva and his 
democratic party, were talking past one other.  As a leadership 
collective of different classes, they had not entered into 
dialogue that made two-way practical sense of how political 
reform advanced the country.   
Tongan academic, Siosiua Lafitani, unpicked the 
systematic rift.  Modifying Tonga’s parliamentary arrangement 
was a “copy-cat work with no clear-cut amalgamation of the 
best from ours and overseas” (Lafitani, 2013).  In context, 
upping the scoreboard by increasing parliamentary seats for 
the people’s representatives to outnumber the nobles’ 
representatives at 17 to 9 was a fundamental reform measure.  
Additionally, transferring some of the monarch’s absolute 
powers to a prime minister elected by the House and an 
appointed cabinet presented a substantial modification.  But 
combined, they set-off conflicting assumptions. 
For Pohiva and the democratic party, this signalled the 
start of on-going changes in which the next step would be to 
fully replicate a Western model of democracy.  Conversely for 
the establishment of traditional leaders – the monarchy, 
nobility, and conservative church hierarchy – the 
underpinning governance principles of a 19th century 
constitution were not to be tampered with (Ministry of Justice, 
2013).  Siosiua Lafitani warned that left unsettled, “the 
political situation is evolving to a point of disaster” (Lafitani, 
2013).         
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The democracy process in Tonga is like putting the cart 
before the horse because the new system was built on 
the basis of overseas ideas but not on the socio-political 
and cultural basis of Tongan society.  It is a kind of 
copy-cat work with no clear-cut amalgamation of the 
best from ours and overseas.  The political situation is 
evolving to a point of disaster; it is getting worse, 
unless it is overhauled and adjusted to bring the horse 
in front of the cart. (Lafitani, 2013). 
 
 
Limits of power 
An unpredictable social climate opened up, one that was 
susceptible to the mind-set and temperament of changeability, 
volatility, and king-size male ego.  What I am pointing at to 
begin with is the question of how the nobility was included in 
the legislative assembly, and the limits that had been 
proposed around their election by the opposition leaders. 
‘Akilisi Pohiva and Sitiveni Halapua, the leader and deputy 
of the Democratic Party of the Friendly Islands were hard-
nosed about modifying Tonga’s electoral system to diminish 
the nobility’s collective voting power.  Seeing the landed gentry 
in the House as the country’s balance of power, they wanted 
registered voters to elect both the seventeen people’s 
representatives and the nine nobles’ representatives, and by 
doing so, abolish the nobles’ election (Magnall, 2012).  
Traditionally the landed gentry of thirty three titled men with 
estates held their own in-house election. 
Airing his views to Radio New Zealand, Pohiva averred that 
“the people of Tonga before the election” expected the prime 
minister’s role to “be taken over by the people” (Magnall, 
2012).  His political rhetoric was by no means an accurate 
representation of “the people of Tonga” (Magnall, 2012).  
Really, he was signalling to voters that supported his 
democratic party in the 2010 general election, whom clearly 
were not the country’s majority vote.   Pohiva’s deep-seated 
disgruntlement was how the parliamentary system could be 
readjusted to prohibit the people’s representatives who were 
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not members of his political party from electing a nobles’ 
representative from the legislature as the Prime Minister of 
Tonga.  Was such a proscription democratic by nature?  The 
short answer is no. 
 
The expectation of the people of Tonga before the 
election was that leadership will be taken over by the 
people because His Majesty already surrendered his 
constitutional power to cabinet.  However, after the 
election we had five independent people’s 
representatives out of seventeen and they crossed the 
floor and support the minority group of the nine nobles, 
and that they had the number. (Magnall, 2012). 
 
Pohiva and Halapua’s media strategy to Radio New 
Zealand and Radio Australia made out that this issue was a 
sore point of social inequality in Tonga’s suffrage.  They drew 
in support from developed country observers.  Consequently, 
outside sympathisers were shaped to believe that Tonga’s 
democracy was partial, incomplete, unfinished business, 
which would inevitably result in putting an end to the nobles’ 
election. 
Sitiveni Halapua followed the leader in his Radio New 
Zealand interview, repeating the “number games” argument 
(Magnall, 2012).  Taking the same stance as ‘Akilisi Pohiva, 
Halapua’s complaint was how to obstruct people’s 
representatives from aligning with the landed gentry to elect a 
noble prime minister. 
 
I cannot see any possibility of developing and building 
our economy with that type of system.  It’s all about 
personal interest and it’s all about number games.  The 
national interest, what is good for the country as a 
whole, is completely squash [sic] and disappear; it’s a 
non-issue. (Magnall, 2012). 
   
Milking the sympathy vein of foreign media and the 
governments of New Zealand and Australia, Pohiva and 
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Halapua urged that a Western ideal had to be inserted into 
Tonga’s constitution; that was, the right of citizens to elect all 
members of parliament including the nobility.  Blatantly the 
opposition leaders hid historical context, giving the impression 
that importing a one-size-fits-all democracy from New Zealand 
and Australia would fit Tonga faultlessly.  This was not true.  
The constitutional changes put forward were self-serving, 
mismatched to Tongan political organisation, and deeply 
flawed. 
The danger hinged on equitable representation of social 
and class interests inside the Tongan parliament.  If the 
nobles’ in-house election was no longer independent, there 
loomed a risk that the democratic party, the only political 
party in the legislative assembly, might politically sway the 
popular election of the landed gentry to vote in representatives 
whom the party could puppet.  Was such a proposition 
democratic by nature?  Again, the short answer is no. 
Tongan media publisher, Pesi Fonua, commented to Radio 
New Zealand on what he perceived to be the hiccup in the 
House.  Underlying principles, morals, and values which 
prompted politicians to make decisions in the legislature were 
hazy.  And when decisions get passed by parliamentary vote 
on vague grounds that the general public cannot make certain 
sense of, it is difficult, somewhat doubtful, to see “a 
democratic system” at work (Magnall, 2012). 
 
If you look at the House now, it’s just a group of 
individuals.  When it comes to the vote, I don’t know 
what make [sic] them decide to vote for this and vote for 
that, you know.  So the politics hasn’t really developed 
in the line how you think how politics in a democratic 
system works. (Magnall, 2012). 
 
Three years into political reform, a repetitious cycle had 
snared the newly democratised Tongan state in a structural 
constraint.  By this, a long-standing class struggle between 
the people, the commoners, versus the nobility and the 
monarchy, kept replaying.  The democratic party’s pitch to 
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abolish the nobles’ election as well as other alternatives to 
revising the electoral system were not rigorously debated in 
parliament, but erased from official state matters.  If anything, 
repressing political discord fuelled scepticism about the 
genuineness of the ruling class towards citizens having greater 
participation in state decision-making processes, instead of 




Free and poor 
“The nobles hold together the strands of the traditions and 
culture that we value in this country,” said the late noble 
Ma’afu (Morton, 2001, p. 47).  It was a declaration of national 
identity that few Tongans, if any, would publicly contest, 
especially in a head-to-head disagreement with a high-ranking 
noble, parliamentarian, and senior statesman as Ma’afu was 
in his time.  What lay beneath his testimony of one’s people 
and country was a sharp jab at dissent politics, the brand of 
opposition politicking which the democratic party had 
exacerbated, and become renowned for, in Tonga’s present-day 
reform. 
Ma’afu noted that sustainable culture entails “continuing 
obligations” to the traditional hierarchy, which despite being 
“called a burden,” is the social glue that “holds Tongan culture 
together” (Morton, 2001, p. 47).  His feelings were 
uncomplicated; you either want the culture to hold together as 
the relationship “essence” between “the King, the nobility and 
the people,” or you do not (Morton, 2001, p. 47). 
 
We are still free and proud of it.”  The nobles, he 
argued, “hold together the strands of the traditions and 
culture that we value in this country.”  Despite these 
changes in Tonga, “the communion between the King, 
the nobility and the people, that is the essence of our 
tradition and culture, continued and thus maintained 
our traditions and culture.”  Finally, he referred to the 
people’s continuing obligations to the nobles: “Yet the 
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task that is called a burden is the very effort that holds 
Tongan culture together.” (Morton, 2001, p. 47).  
 
In spite of Tonga’s push for reform, the declaration of 
culture could not be outflanked.  Politicians in the Kingdom of 
Tonga were not about to calculatingly destroy, degrade, and 
decimate national culture and identity.  Some politicians 
wanted an amended version that avoided exhausting the 
limited financial resources of poor Tongan families for gift-
giving ceremonies.  And the democratic party desired to be the 
government.  But to extinguish Tongan culture was off the 
parliamentary agenda.  Presented here was the small island 
dilemma of being ill-fitted for putting on a cut-and-paste 
model of other people’s democracy. 
By this, “the political nation of Tonga” that Siu’ilikutapu 
spoke of created a system of power centring culture as the 
unifying principle.  Culture bound Tongans together through 
kinship, relationship, and obligation to each other, to the 
country, and to the Kingdom.  Amputating culture from the 
political arrangement was non-negotiable, which made it 
almost incomprehensible to even suggest exterminating the 
monarchy and nobility from political leadership roles, duties, 
responsibilities.  
Outside the parliament setting, church and community 
leaders observed that the political obligations of people’s 
representatives should have been met by social justice 
advocacy for the poor, the dispossessed, the vulnerable.  
Instead, community development work had been neglected for 
two years rolling into three, while the opposition wrangled with 
the government for power. 
The Reverend Dr Finau ‘Ahio, President of the Free 
Wesleyan Church in Tonga, candidly commented that the 
“people are struggling.  Our economy has reached an all-time 
low” (Magnall, 2012).  His attention focused on “our school 
leavers” who are “just doing nothing” because there are no 
jobs, and little hope of finding post-secondary employment in 
Tonga. 
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People are struggling.  Our economy has reached an all-
time low.  Most of our school leavers, twenty per cent 
they can have a job and also they are given 
scholarships to go overseas, but the eighty per cent, 
they just go back to their homes and their villages, just 
doing nothing. (Magnall, 2012).  
 
Vanessa Lolohea, executive director of the Tonga National 
Youth Congress, the country’s non-government organisation 
with the largest membership, added insight to Reverend ‘Ahio’s 
activism on youth unemployment.  She admitted that 
parliament and government had not engaged in “any 
discussion on unemployment at all,” particularly for “young 
people” (Magnall, 2012).  The majority of Tonga’s national 
population at 104,509 people were under 35 years of age, the 
median being 21 years old.  Migration was the coveted 
pathway for getting a job and having life choices outside the 
margins of unemployment and poverty.  Lolohea’s thoughts 
pointed at the state, the parliamentarians expressly, who did 
not appear overly worried that a young nation of Tongans 
without jobs sparks serious consequences for sustaining an 
economy, a country, a people. 
 
There hasn’t been any discussion on unemployment at 
all.  The focus of young people [that] don’t have a job is 
to go overseas, since if you stay here you will look 
around, make do with the government job or you try to 
make your own job and that will be in agriculture and 
fisheries.  But since there isn’t any market available or 
any commodity that’s being export or have been for a 
couple of years, it’s not solution for them at all, it’s 




If I had to identify one critical area of Tonga’s social landscape 
that concerns me, then it is succession of political leadership.  
Who are the younger generation leaders that possess the 
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capability and confidence to infiltrate parliament and hold 
their own in a House dominated by older men, some who have 
spent a lifetime in the public service becoming comfy and 
smug with their lot?  Who are the younger generation leaders 
that represent vulnerable groups – women and children, rural 
villages and outer islands, poor people, people without land or 
assets, people without titles or tertiary education, people not 
born into privilege or material means – who are these people?   
And if the younger generation leaders are nameless, 
faceless, and voiceless, imagined only as a state demographic 
labelled young people, young unemployed people, young 
people who want to escape Tonga for overseas, then what have 
the generations before done to sentence them to marginalised 
lives, impoverished livelihoods, limited life choices?  Or more 
fittingly, what have the generations before not done, not 
attended to, not paid attention to? 
On a final note, the democratic party in Tonga’s legislative 
assembly destabilised political reform not singly by forgoing 
due process when submitting the parliamentary select 
committee report on the Nuku’alofa reconstruction accusing 
individuals of breaching law.  Pushing a vote of no confidence 
in the prime minister and losing was not the sole political 
action undermining the democratisation of state and society.  
Oddly enough, it was the party’s disinclination to be the 
opposition in the House, to stay focussed on social justice 
advocacy called for by communities, and to debate on-point 
economic development strategies assisting vulnerable groups 
such as young people, which brought down their performance.  
Those who stood to lose the most by a weak opposition were 
younger generation leaders wanting political role models to 
look up to. 
 
We are Oceania 
connected through our bloodlines 
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Fie’ poto  Know-it-all person/s; wanna be expert with no 
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